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Abstract 
Most countries regulate political finance and many offer public subsidies to political parties or 
candidates. Proponents of political finance regulations claim that public money reduces 
corruption in politics, while opponents worry that public subsidies have no impact on corruption 
and in some cases may add to it. Despite national-level debates and billions of taxpayer dollars, 
few studies test this relationship. We argue that political finance subsidies reduce corruption by 
reducing the influence of private money in politics and increasing legal and media sanctions for 
corrupt behavior. We evaluate the argument with an original dataset measuring political subsidies 
from 154 countries from 1900-2012, as well as disaggregated corruption measures from the 
Varieties of Democracy project. We also conduct a case study of political finance regulations in 
Paraguay. Our findings suggest that political finance subsidies reduce corruption, and particularly 
embezzlement, even in countries where regulations are unevenly implemented. 
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1. Introduction 
Nearly all countries now regulate political finance, and many offer subsidies for political parties 
or candidates. Public officials and scholars often claim that these interventions are necessary for 
the full achievement of representative democracy and good governance, and especially for 
combating political corruption (Bryan & Baer 2005; Casas-Zamora 2005; Council of Europe 
2003; United States Agency for International Development 2003).  
Not everyone is optimistic. Skeptics point to the difficulty of implementing political 
finance regulations. Recurring scandals in some of the world’s oldest and most generous political 
finance systems (e.g., Costa Rica, Germany, Israel, and France) seem to suggest that political 
finance has little impact, or perhaps even malevolent effects, on political behavior (Casas-
Zamora 2005, p.39; Pinto-Duschinsky 2002, p.78; Williams 2000, p.1-8). Laws on the books are 
often weakly enforced, and even when they are enforced officials find ways to skirt regulations 
(Bryan & Baer 2005, p.4; La Raja 2014a, p.714). Bryan and Baer (2005, p.4) suggest that 
unenforced political finance laws may encourage corruption while Mietzer (2016, p.102) argues 
that Indonesia’s comprehensive but poorly implemented political finance laws hide endemic 
corruption. Calland (2016, p.152) finds that in South Africa subsidies put more money in corrupt 
elites’ pockets and do not combat entrenched corruption. Roper (2002, p.186) suggests the same 
in Eastern Europe, with Romania as a case in point. Large-n crossnational analyses of the 
question discern no relationship between political finance subsidies and corruption (Evertsson 
2013, p.83; Norris & Abel van Es 2016, p.251).  
Yet, evidence for these conclusions is selective. Evertsson (2013) and Norris and Abel 
van Es (2016) rely on cross-sectional analyses of a single year. Other studies focus on individual 
countries whose experiences may or may not be representative. Despite the importance of the 
issue and its prominence in popular discourse, the relationship between political finance and the 
quality of governance is under-theorized and has not been tested in a systematic fashion, perhaps 
because of the absence of suitable data (Butler 2010; Hopkin 2004; Samuels 2001). 
 In this study, we offer a straightforward argument for how and why campaign finance 
might impact political corruption, and what sort of corruption it might affect. To test the 
argument we construct a new dataset that measures public subsidies for parties and campaigns 
across most sovereign countries over the past century. This index is analyzed in a panel format 
using a measure of political corruption drawn from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
project. We also trace the effects of political finance regulations through interviews with officials 
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in Paraguay. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that political finance reform 
reduces political corruption across a range of government offices.  
 
2. Why Political Finance Might Matter 
The concept of political finance, as employed here, encompasses three elements: the legal and 
statutory regulation of money in politics (stipulating what practices are legal or illegal), 
government subsidies (in-kind or monetary) to support political parties and/or candidates for 
public office, and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that laws regulating behavior and subsidies 
are adhered to (Gokcekus & Sonan 2016; Rose-Ackerman 1978). In principle, these factors vary 
independently: regulatory burdens may be strong, weak, or nonexistent; subsidies may be high, 
low, or nonexistent; enforcement may be strong, weak, or nonexistent. In practice, they tend to 
cohere (Evertsson 2013; Norris & Abel van Es 2016). It is rare to find generous subsidies 
unaccompanied by extensive regulation, for example. Thus, we consider regulation, subsidies, 
and enforcement as components of a compound treatment with multiple levels. 
Political corruption may be defined in a general fashion as the abuse of public office for 
private gain (Rose-Ackerman 1999, p.91). Typically, it involves the exchange of money or goods 
for political influence (Della Porta & Vannucci 1999; Evertsson 2013). Sometimes, this 
agreement is explicit, a quid pro quo arrangement (e.g., a bribe) whereby a specific amount of 
money is transferred from a principal, A, to an agent, B, in exchange for B’s action on an issue of 
concern to A (Butler 2010, p.2; Gokcekus & Sonan 2016; Williams 2000, p.1-2, 8). At other 
times, the exchange is implicit – a general understanding that A would like B to “do something 
about Policy X.” We hold exchanges of this sort to be corrupt in the general sense of the term 
even if they break no existing law, as they involve what most would regard as an abuse of public 
office for private gain (McMenamin 2012, p.5). A public official may also embezzle state 
resources by illegally redirecting them to a campaign or into their own accounts. 
 In considering the impact of political finance reform on political corruption, we focus on 
the incentives facing politicians (those who hold public office or aspire to do so). We assume 
that politicians are motivated to win election, or reelection. We shall also assume that money 
plays an important role in winning elections in a context of multi-party competition (Samuels 
2001) but that its marginal utility declines. A candidate’s first dollar is worth much more than 
their last dollar (Abramowitz 1988; Gerber 1998; Green & Krasno 1988; Levitt 1994). 
 Funding for election campaigns and party activities may be raised privately or publicly. 
Private money is susceptible to corrupt exchanges of money for influence, as defined above 
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(Evertsson 2013; Gokcekus & Sonan 2016). Public money is not. In making this assertion we are 
assuming that there are no corrupt bargains between the state, which provides funding, and the 
recipients of that funding. Note that in most instances subsidy disbursement formulas are very 
specific and therefore difficult to manipulate. Occasionally, election observers report that money 
arrives late or not at all (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2014, 
p.50), but this may be a result of laziness or ineptitude. We have not encountered allegations of 
corrupt bargains between parties (or candidates) and state agencies around subsidy disbursement.  
It follows that to the extent that the role of private money in electoral campaigns is 
minimized, opportunities for corruption decrease. This may be accomplished by regulation, e.g., 
limiting the amount of money that candidates or parties can obtain from private sources, the 
kinds of donors that can contribute to campaigns, the amounts that each donor can contribute, 
and the transparency of these transactions (Fisher 2000, p.16; McSweeney 2000, p.39-40). It may 
also be accomplished by subsidizing campaigns with publicly provided funds or in-kind support 
(e.g., free access to broadcast media), which may replace or supplement money that officials raise 
privately (Bryan & Baer 2005; Butler 2010; Williams 2000). If public money is provided on a 
supplementary basis, private money persists, to be sure. However, its importance in winning 
elections is mitigated by virtue of the declining marginal utility of money in a campaign (Gerber 
1998). This, in turn, should mitigate the necessity of raising money and the degree to which 
politicians are beholden to donors. 
We must also consider the possibility of legal sanction. All political finance laws are 
accompanied by an enforcement mechanism, intended to punish those who contravene the law 
(Evertsson 2013). Sanctions may include loss of office, fines, and/or incarceration. Of course, 
enforcement is uncertain, and it is difficult to gauge the strength and independence of the 
enforcement mechanism in a country (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002, p. 80). Nonetheless, the 
possibility of legal sanction is present when a political finance regime is in place and scarcely 
present when it is not. Insofar as corrupt exchanges violate political finance law, politicians who 
engage in such activities put themselves in legal jeopardy (Hopkin 2004). There are also 
secondary effects on a candidate’s probability of winning election, given that the suggestion of 
scandal – even in the absence of a successful prosecution – may harm a candidacy or even end a 
political career (Balán 2011, p.459; Bassinger 2013, p.386; Hopkin 2004).1 For this reason, as 
well, we can anticipate that political finance laws impact the behavior of politicians. 
                                                
1 While some studies suggest that scandal has no impact on election outcomes (Vaishnav 2017), Bassinger (2013) 
finds that scandal-plagued House members lose votes and are much more likely than other incumbents to lose re-
election, retire, or otherwise leave. In South America, Balán (2011) finds that party insiders leak scandals in an 
attempt to sabotage colleagues’ careers and elevate one faction over another, suggesting that scandals do impact 
election outcomes. 
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In summary, political finance laws attenuate the likelihood of a politician engaging in 
corrupt activity insofar as they (a) reduce the role of private money in campaign finance, (b) 
clarify the legal status of campaign finance activity (i.e., the line between what is legal and illegal), 
and (c) enhance the risk of discovery – and hence of negative publicity and possible legal 
sanction.  
Political finance is only one source of political corruption. Natural resources, state 
monopolies, unstable economies, and many other factors can also fuel the abuse of public power 
for private gain (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Treisman 2000, 2007). Nonetheless, we posit that 
political finance is an important – and certainly understudied – factor. Moreover, as a policy tool, 
political finance reform is easier to implement than most other anti-corruption measures. (As we 
shall see, political parties usually welcome public funding, despite the strings attached to it.) 
Hence, our topic has important practical implications. 
 
3. Comparative Political Finance 
Britain and the United States began regulating political finance in the nineteenth century in an 
attempt to control rampant corruption around elections (Fisher 2000, p.16; La Raja 2008, p.18-
33; Rix 2008, p.65). Uruguay initiated the first political subsidy in 1928, legislating 
reimbursements for campaign expenses. Uruguayan politicians were concerned about the undue 
influence of donors and argued that subsidies would insulate parties from their influence and 
encourage broader representation and competition (Casas-Zamora 2005, p.95). Costa Rica 
introduced post-election reimbursements in 1956, becoming the second country to legislate 
campaign subsidies. According to Casas-Zamora (2005, p.73-74, 95-97), these pioneering subsidy 
schemes were uncontroversial because they regulated practices that citizens viewed with 
suspicion and introduced a measure of transparency through accounting requirements.  
Later, when countries in Western Europe began to reform their political finance laws, 
these same arguments were recycled.2 Germany introduced funding for political parties in 1959 
and political subsidies diffused to most western democracies in the following decades (Koß 
2010; Scarrow 2004, p.661). 
 Countries transitioning to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s often adopted political 
finance regulations from established democracies in Latin America and Europe. For example, 
political finance reforms in Argentina and Mexico were patterned after Spain and Costa Rica, 
and were seen as a replacement for ad-hoc and informal transfers between state and party 
                                                
2 Personal communication, Dr. Maria Gavouneli, GRECO delegate, January 2nd, 2017. 
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(Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 2011). Most post-communist countries crafted political 
finance systems modeled on European systems (Roper 2002, p.175). By the 2000s, world powers 
(especially the United States) and international organizations (e.g., the European Union and the 
Organization of American States) were pushing comprehensive political finance subsidies and 
regulations on the developing world (Council of Europe 2003; Koß 2010; United States Agency 
for International Development 2003). 
 At present, most democracies have political finance laws, and most of those laws include 
direct subsidies to parties or campaigns, as our dataset documents. Laws vary considerably across 
time and place (Butler 2010, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
2014). Most political finance systems mix public and private money (Williams 2000, p.8). The 
only country that prescribes sole reliance on public funding – i.e., the total elimination of non-
public sources – is Bhutan, though Tunisia also banned private donations in the 2011 election 
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, p.49). A handful of mostly 
European countries rely primarily on public funding with some private donations (Butler 2010, 
p.7). In most countries, however, public subsidies comprise a minority of party and campaign 
budgets.  
In addition to diffusion, it is worth noting several commonalities in the adoption of 
political finance reforms around the world. First, legislation is often introduced in the wake of 
major political scandals (Alexander & Shiratori 1994, p. 3; Carlson 2016, p.103; Williams 2000, 
p.2). For example, after decades of limited and unenforced campaign finance regulations, the 
United States introduced campaign subsidies and comprehensive regulations in 1974 in response 
to the Watergate scandal (Briffault 2016, p.180; La Raja 2008, p.18-33; McSweeney 2000, p.40). 
Second, reformers often appeal to the importance of curbing special interests, leveling the 
playing field, and fighting corruption (Williams 2000). Third, public opinion surveys suggest that 
mass publics support political finance regulations like spending caps but are skeptical when 
politicians legislate subsidies that support their own campaigns (Avkiran, Kanol, & Oliver 2016; 
Bryan & Baer 2005, p.21; Primo & Milyo 2006).  
 
3.1. Constructing a Dataset 
A great deal of activity has occurred over the past century in an attempt to reform systems of 
political finance. To capture this activity in a systematic fashion, we construct a dataset that 
covers the world at annual intervals from 1900 to the present. 
Our effort builds upon the 2015 IDEA database of public finance laws, which tracks 
answers to a number of questions related to current public campaign finance for most countries 
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that currently hold elections (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
2017). Helpfully, IDEA publishes its sources – primarily, laws that are currently in force. 
Additional sources used in our coding include supranational reports, election observer reports, 
NGO reports, and academic articles. Of particular note are reports produced by the European 
Union’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), which provide detailed information on 
the history, provisions, implementation and public-private dimensions of campaign finance for 
about sixty countries. We also draw on two reports sponsored by the Organization of American 
States that cover Central and South America and the Caribbean. For African countries, we rely 
on the NGO Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). We enlist election 
observer reports from the EU, the Commonwealth, the AU, EISA, and the Carter Center. 
Where laws or implementation were ambiguous, we sought advice from country experts. 
With the assistance of these sources we coded relevant laws establishing different types 
of political finance regimes in 154 countries that held national elections between 1900 and 2012. 
(Countries that do not hold regular national elections are excluded from the dataset.) For further 
information on coding protocol and sources, the reader is referred to Appendix A. Detailed 
information on each country, including dates of adoption of major public finance initiatives and 
country-specific sources, are included in Appendix B. 
In selecting variables to code, we lean primarily upon the provision of public subsidies 
for candidates and parties. Public subsidies are one of the strongest political finance 
interventions and also serve as a proxy for other regulatory actions that are harder to measure in 
a systematic fashion (Norris & Abel van Es 2016, p.15). We are not aware of any public subsidy 
that is unaccompanied by additional regulatory measures.  
Chosen variables measure: (1) whether a law sets out provisions for regular subsidies to 
party organizations, (2) whether this provision has been implemented, (3) whether a law sets out 
provisions for election campaign subsidies, (4) whether this provision has been implemented, 
and (5) whether a majority of political funds derives from (a) private or (b) public sources. The 
resulting dataset consists of five binary variables coded across 154 countries and 112 years, 
generating 11,409 country-year observations.  
A principal component analysis demonstrates that a single dimension explains most of 
the variance (72%). The first component also loads similarly on all five variables. This suggests 
that our five variables are capturing one underlying concept that can be meaningfully combined 
into a single political finance index (PFI). We form this index by addition because it is easy to 
interpret and to decompose. (Additive and principal components indices are highly correlated 
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(r=0.99), and render similar results, as shown in Appendix C). The resulting additive index 
ranges from 0 to 5. 
Using this index, we are able to visualize changes in political finance globally over time. 
Figure 1 graphs the average political finance index score globally, and in each region, from 1900 
to 2012. In 1960, 98% of countries in the dataset did not have any subsidy law and by 1970 only 
5% of countries had a law on the books. By 1980, 11% of countries at least had a law on the 
books and by 1990, the number had more than doubled to 23%. The drop in Europe’s average 
around 1990 corresponds to the former USSR countries gaining independence; by 2000, most of 
these countries had added some political finance regulations and the regional mean recovers.  
Figure 1: Average political finance index score, by region 1900-2012 
 
Graph of political finance index, aggregated by region and globally, 1900-2012. 
  
In the 21st century, political finance emerged as a global norm. By 2010, 63% of countries 
in the dataset had a law on the books establishing subsidies and most distributed subsidies. In 
20% of countries, public funds supplied the majority of the money in politics. Although political 
finance regulations are common in all regions, Europe has overtaken Latin America as the region 
with the most far-reaching legislation, while Africa and Asia lag behind.   
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3.2. A Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis of Political 
Finance Regimes 
To test the relationship between political finance and corruption we need to think carefully 
about the functional form of this relationship. We presume that the impact of political finance 
reform accrues over time but with diminishing marginal returns. To operationalize this 
expectation we construct a stock variable that adds the score registered for a country in each year 
(starting from 1900 up to the last year in our dataset, 2012) with a one percent depreciation rate 
(following Gerring et al. 2005). We further presume that the impact of a country’s accumulated 
stock has diminishing marginal returns on corruption. The stock variable is therefore 
transformed by the natural logarithm. 
To measure corruption, we rely on a measure drawn from the Varieties of Democracy 
dataset (McMann et al 2017). This corruption index aggregates indicators of corruption in 
different arenas – executive, legislative, public sector, and judicial. Underlying data is coded by 
country experts and integrated into a global dataset with a Bayesian latent variable measurement 
model (Pemstein et al. 2015). McMann et al (2017) report that the V-Dem index covers more 
types of corruption than other corruption datasets and aligns with theoretical definitions of 
corruption. They also find that the individual indicators load heavily on a single dimension, 
justifying the construction of an aggregated index (McMann et al 2017, p.9-12). 
We recognize that all corruption indices are prone to measurement error (Jensen et al 
2010; Olken & Pande 2012; Sequeira & Djankov 2010). There is no way of knowing exactly how 
much corruption exists because individuals have incentives to hide or underreport the corruption 
that they engage in, and may be unaware of what goes on outside their immediate purview (Della 
Porta & Vannucci 1999; Olken 2009). Nonetheless, these indices provide our best guess about 
the level of corruption obtaining in different countries around the world, and there is no reason 
to suspect that they are subject to systematic error with respect to the predictors of interest in 
this study.  
The V-Dem index offers a substantial improvement in coverage relative to other indices, 
as yearly estimates extend from the turn of the twentieth century to the present, offering an 
unparalleled time series. Other cross-national measures, like Transparency International’s 
Perceptions of Corruption index or the World Bank’s corruption estimates, cover only the last 
two decades – during which time few countries have experienced appreciable change in their 
measured level of corruption. Note also that systematic error is most likely to be associated with 
cross-country comparisons, insofar as corruption may be understood or manifested differently in 
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different contexts, rendering estimates that are not crossnationally equivalent. The expansive 
data provided by V-Dem allows for a time-series format (with country fixed-effects), where a 
country is compared to itself over time. This sort of comparison seems less prone to systematic 
error in measurement that might lead to biased estimates. 
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for each variable in the models in Table 2. 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Corruption Index (V-Dem) .009 .946 .439 .264 
PFI stock (ln) (authors 0 5.594 .601 1.344 
PFI stock (V-Dem) -138.375 150.893 -34.205 43.308 
Polyarchy  .008 .958 .321 .281 
GDP per capita (log) 5.315 10.667 7.844 1.037 
Urbanization 008 1 .350 .250 
GDP Growth -61.493 86.946 1.871 6.378 
Regular Elections (binary) 0 (39%) 1 (61%)   
 
3.3. Initial Tests 
Table 2 presents a series of time-series cross-sectional analyses where corruption is regressed 
against a political finance index (PFI). An ordinary least squares estimator is employed along 
with country and year fixed effects, with errors clustered by country. Right side variables are 
lagged five years behind the outcome.  
Model 1 includes only the variable of theoretical interest, PFI stock (log). Model 2 adds 
several covariates commonly regarded as causes of corruption – and, perhaps, of political finance 
reform. A number of studies have shown that democracy has nonlinear effects on corruption 
(Treisman 2001, 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1999) and perhaps on policy implementation, including 
political finance (Norris & Abel van Es 2016; Rose-Ackerman 1999). We therefore include an 
index measuring the quality of democracy – Polyarchy (Teorell et al. 2016) – and its quadratic. 
Virtually all studies of corruption regard economic development, measured as per capita GDP 
(log), as a background factor (Mauro 1995, Treisman 2001, 2007). Owing to the ubiquity of these 
variables in studies of corruption, and their strong performance in our models, we regard this as 
a benchmark model.  
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In Model 3, we add several additional covariates that are less central in the literature but 
may nonetheless serve as confounders. This includes urban population, GDP growth, and 
regular elections (Fisman & Svenson 2007, Mauro 1995, Treisman 2007). Results are significant 
and fairly stable across all model specifications where PFI is the predictor. 
In Model 4, we adopt an alternate measure of political finance, drawn from V-Dem, 
where coding is by multiple country experts, aggregated together in a latent-variable 
measurement model. This variable is also calculated as historical stock.3 It is not logged because 
the V-Dem measurement model ensures that the underlying data approximate a normal 
distribution. Estimates show a somewhat weaker, but nonetheless negative and significant (at 
p<0.01), correlation between political finance and corruption. This provides some assurance that 
our results are not the product of measurement error for the treatment variable. 
Table 2:  Political finance and corruption 1900-2012 
 1 2 3 4 
PFI stock (ln) (authors) -.034**** 
(.007) 
-.017*** 
(.006) 
-.017*** 
(.006) 
 
PFI stock (V-Dem) 
   
-.001** 
(.0002) 
Polyarchy   .195* 
(.113) 
.248* 
(.149) 
.298*** 
(.108) 
Polyarchy2  -.395**** 
(.121) 
-.441*** 
(.151) 
-.500**** 
(.108) 
GDP per capita (log)  -.05** 
(.020) 
-.043** 
(.020) 
-.052**** 
(.010) 
Urbanization   -.192* 
(.020) 
 
GDP Growth   -.001 
(.002) 
 
Regular Elections   .011 
(.016) 
 
Year fixed effects ü ü ü ü 
Country fixed effects ü ü ü ü 
Countries 154 141 137 152 
Years 111 111 111 111 
Obs 10,742 8,785 8,513 9,968 
R2 (within) (0.13) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
 
Outcome: political corruption (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. Estimator: ordinary least 
squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard errors clustered by 
country. *≤p.1 **p≤.05  ***p≤.01 ****≤p.001 
                                                
3 The correlation between our measure and the V-Dem measure is .33. 
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 Figure 2 displays how predicted values for corruption vary with PFI stock (log) in Model 
2, the benchmark model, holding all other variables at their means. Note that the confidence 
intervals increase at higher values of the PFI because there are few countries that have had 
comprehensive political finance regimes in place for more than 30 years. To gain a more specific 
understanding of this relationship, let us consider the hypothetical case of a country with no 
prior political finance experience (PFI=0) that adopts a full set of measures (a maximum score 
on the index) in year 1 and maintains those regulations over the subsequent decade (PFI=4.02). 
Levels of corruption in this country are predicted to fall from 0.49 to 0.42 or .37 standard 
deviations, which is equivalent to a shift in levels of corruption found in Cambodia to those 
found in Jordan. 
Figure 2:  Predicted Values 
 
Predicted values for corruption as the PFI stock (log) increases, holding all other variables in the 
benchmark model at their means. 
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disaggregated into its component parts – measuring corruption in the executive, the legislature, 
the public sector, and the judiciary, respectively. Each forms a dependent variable in subsequent 
regression tests that mirror our benchmark model (Model 2, Table 2). Results are consistently 
negative and significant across all components, suggesting that political finance reform has wide-
ranging effects across national-level institutions.  
Table 3:  Political finance and disaggregated corruption measures 1900-2012 
Outcome 
Executive 
corruption 
Legislative 
corruption 
Public 
sector 
corruption 
Judicial  
corruption  
Media 
corruption 
(placebo) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
PFI stock (ln) -.016** 
(.008) 
-.079** 
(.037) 
-.020*** 
(.007) 
-.071*** 
(.025) 
.033 
(.030) 
Polyarchy .038 
(.133) 
1.71** 
(.823) 
.132 
(.118) 
.724 
(.479) 
-3.667**** 
(.652) 
Polyarchy2 -.276** 
(.138) 
-2.271*** 
(.829) 
-.338*** 
(.121) 
-1.585*** 
(.508) 
1.435** 
(.700) 
GDP per capita (logged) -.049* 
(.027) 
-.241* 
(.135) 
-.041* 
(.021) 
-.224*** 
(.081) 
-.107 
(.112) 
Year fixed effects ü ü ü ü ü 
Country fixed effects ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 141 141 141 141 141 
Years 111 111 111 111 111 
Obs 8,785 8,785 8,785 8,785 8,785 
R2 (within) (0.13) (0.16) (.0.14) (0.18) (0.44) 
Outcome: corruption in different sectors (V-Dem), forward-lagged by five years. Estimator: 
ordinary least squares panel analysis with two-way fixed effects (unit and time) and standard 
errors clustered by country. *≤p.1 **p≤.05  ***p≤.01 ****≤p.001   
 
 The final column of Table 3 adopts a slightly different outcome, measuring corruption in 
the media. This variable, also drawn from the V-Dem project, is not included as a component of 
the public corruption index. It measures the likelihood that members of the media take money 
or receive favors in exchange for altering their coverage of political events. Media corruption can 
be damaging to a polity, but is not strictly speaking public corruption since members of the 
media do not (generally) work for the government. Thus, we have no reason to suspect that 
changes in political finance would have any effect on levels of media corruption. Indeed, there is 
no relationship between the two factors in our benchmark specification, as shown in Model 5.  
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We regard this as an important placebo test. If the covariation between PFI and public 
corruption were spurious, we would expect it to have a (spurious) relationship to other variables 
in the V-Dem dataset that measure similar outcomes.  
 Further robustness tests are contained in Appendix C. There, we explore changes in 
model specification, estimator, and sample, e.g., random effects (rather than fixed effects), lagged 
dependent variable models, varying lags of the right-side variables, and split-sample tests that 
restrict the sample to recent decades or drop influential cases or regions. We also show results 
for PFI in the benchmark model when varying depreciation rates are used in constructing the 
stock for this index, when the components of the PFI are aggregated using the first component 
of a principal components analysis, when the PFI is measured as a level (rather than stock) 
variable, and when the stock variable is measured in a linear, rather than logarithmic, form. In all 
these tests, political finance regulations show a strong, negative, and statistically significant 
relationship to political corruption. 
 
4. Case Study: Paraguay 
In this section of the paper, we develop a case study to illustrate the argument and to shed light 
on the mechanisms (M) that may lie between the apparent cause, X (political finance reform), 
and the outcome, Y (corruption). To serve this “pathway” function we searched for a case that 
seems to exhibit the relationship of interest – as portrayed in the cross-country empirical analysis 
– without a lot of potential confounders (Z). Assuming for the moment that X causes Y across 
the population, the pathway case is a country where X covaries with Y and Z is constant or 
exhibits a trend that is inconsistent with observed variation in Y (Gerring 2017). 
 Beginning with our global sample, we began by eliminating cases with little or no 
variation in X. Second, we eliminated rich countries, where improvements in corruption might 
be the product of modernization. (In the aggregate, i.e., in the panel analysis, we are confident 
that aggregate modernization effects are effectively handled through covariates measuring per 
capita GDP, GDP growth, and urbanization. At the case level, stochastic features pose a greater 
threat.) Third, we ran bivariate time-series analyses for the remaining countries to see where 
there was a strongly negative relationship between political finance subsidies and corruption, 
thus offering a possibility of elucidating the causal pathway of theoretical interest. A small 
sample of countries passed this remaining test. Looking closely at the details of these cases, we 
determined that Paraguay was least subject to potential confounders (other events coincident in 
time with political finance reform), and therefore an appropriate choice for intensive analysis. 
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While many countries legislate political finance subsidies as part of a large reform package or a 
constitutional reform during a regime change, Paraguay introduced its political finance reform 
several years after a new constitution and transition to democracy. 
 To develop the case study, one coauthor spent three months in Asunción, Paraguay, 
conducting elite interviews. Informants included top political figures who were active when the 
1996 reform was debated and adopted, currently active officials, and NGO workers and 
academics who focus on political finance and corruption issues. We use the full names of elected 
officials who spoke with us on record because they are public figures, and thus do not require 
confidentiality according to IRB guidelines. The names of other informants – appointed officials, 
political operatives, NGO workers, and academics – have been replaced with pseudonyms in 
accordance with IRB guidelines. A protocol of questions, a list of interview dates and names (for 
elected officials whose anonymity is not protected), is contained in Appendix D. 
 
4.1. Background  
Paraguay experienced institutionalized corruption under the Stroessner dictatorship, from 1954 
to 1989. During the authoritarian era, General Stroessner and his Colorado party controlled the 
state and encouraged corruption as a way to pad salaries (Nickson 1997, p.24). High-level 
officials were also involved in drug trafficking (Nickson & Lambert 2002, p.166). Though 
corruption has declined in recent decades, Paraguay remains the fifth most corrupt country in 
Latin America, according to the V-Dem corruption index. Former president Federico Franco 
states, “Paraguay is known for its triple border, narco-trafficking, car trafficking, wood 
smuggling, all sorts of illegal money.” 4  Bribery is often expected from public officials, 
embezzlement is commonplace, and few corruption cases make it through the courts 
(Hetherington 2011, Lambert & Nickson 2002, p.166). Figure 3 illustrates Paraguay’s decline 
from extreme corruption during the Stroessner dictatorship to moderate corruption under the 
current regime.  
 
                                                
4 Interview with Federico Franco, July 3, 2017 
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Figure 3. Corruption in Paraguay, 1900-2012 
 
The vertical line marks the initiation of political finance reform (1996). 
 
Granted, some of that improvement might be credited to the transition to democracy, as 
suggested by the time-series in Figure 3. Following a coup that returned the country to civilian 
rule, Paraguay introduced a new constitution (1992), and held its first democratic elections 
(1993). However, the transition to democracy cannot plausibly account for all the progress that 
Paraguay has registered in combatting corruption. Note that democratic transitions are usually 
accompanied by an increase in corruption – especially electoral corruption, insofar as parties and 
politicians now must compete in multi-party elections, and often choose to do so with an 
expenditure of funds to buy votes or influence turnout, among other things (Keefer 2007; 
McMann et al. 2017). We see considerable evidence of this in the Paraguayan case, vindicating 
the widely accepted view that the first-order effects of democratization on corruption are 
negative rather than positive. In the 1993 election, the Colorados were the only party with a 
developed party infrastructure and experienced personnel, as well as unrestricted access to state 
resources (Riquelme & Riquelme 1997, p.48). In an election marked by rampant vote buying and 
embezzlement where campaigns were run out of state offices, the Colorados easily beat the 
disorganized and underfunded Liberal opposition party (ibid).  
Colorado politicians, in consultation with Liberal representatives, introduced political 
finance legislation. Both parties wanted legitimate state funds for their campaigns and party 
organizations. Additionally, the Colorados were confident that they could maintain their national 
majority against a better-funded opposition, particularly since subsidies are allocated based on 
how many seats each party has in Congress, an arrangement that continues to favor the 
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Colorados. The law explicitly outlawed the use of state resources and facilities for campaigns and 
required parties to publish financial accounts. The law also introduced substantial subsidies for 
campaigns and yearly subsidies for parties, and public subsidies now cover roughly half of a 
campaign’s expenses, though the proportion of public to private money is dropping. The two 
larger parties fund day-to-day operations with a mix of private and public money, but smaller 
parties rely almost entirely on public funding. In 1996, 18 newly appointed electoral judges were 
charged with enforcing the law, which only uses injunctions and confiscation to punish 
violations. 
In interviews, officials from multiple parties stated that Colorado politicians proposed 
the law as a limited concession to the Liberal party and as a strategy for creating a stable, legal 
funding base for both parties. The law enjoyed bipartisan support from Colorados and Liberals. 
Most Liberals supported the subsidies because they provided a basic level of guaranteed funding 
that, they assumed, would enable the party to compete more successfully. However, some 
Liberals and third parties criticized the agreement because disbursements are based on how 
many seats a party has in the legislature, sending a majority of funds to the Colorados. Colorados 
supported the plan because it handed them guaranteed and legal funding, and made elections 
more competitive without threatening their hold on the executive or legislative majorities. 
Subsidies were first distributed to parties in 1997 and to candidates in the 1998 elections. 
Subsidies appear to have had an immediate electoral effect, even with this uneven distribution 
across the two major parties. With a guaranteed funding floor, Liberal politicians were able to 
run viable campaigns and won additional seats in the 1998 elections, especially at local levels. 
Still, the Colorados maintained their legislative majority and have held the executive in all but 
one election. 
 
4.2. Effects and Mechanisms 
We turn now to the question of theoretical interest. Did the passage of campaign finance reform 
reduce corruption in Paraguay? Our interview data strongly suggest that it did. To explain the 
relationship, interviewees pointed to several causal mechanisms. 
First, public funding displaced the importance of private money in campaigns and gave 
officials more discretion over funding sources. Carlos Riveros, a former Liberal Party 
congressman who was in office during the 1996 reform, explained, “This public subsidy to the 
parties plays a very important role. It is the foundation of its finances, but it isn’t everything… In 
terms of incentives for corruption, when one has resources they don’t need to resort to 
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extremes, and can use these resources.”5 Riveros implies that politicians will resort to corruption 
to fund organizations and campaigns, but that they see corruption as an extreme option and 
would prefer legal sources. A community organizer for the Liberal Party agreed: “The greater the 
influx of state subsidies, the greater the diminishing of the need to resort to other types of 
financing.”6 Sebastian Acha, a former senator from the small Patria Querida party added, “Public 
funds allow honest politicians to compete.” These statements are consistent with our argument, 
which posits that public subsidies reduce the role of private money in politics and in doing so, 
reduce incentives for corruption. 
Second, the law clarified what was legal and illegal in political financing and introduced 
minimal accountability regulations. These measures standardized practices and expectations 
around political finance. Prior to the law, few politicians kept records of expenditures and 
officials ran campaigns out of state offices. Under the circumstances, it was hard for the press, or 
the public – or even the politicians – to tell when they were on the right side of the law. After 
the passage of the law, officials knew that they were expected to keep records of where money 
came from and how it was spent, and they knew that the law outlawed the use of state resources 
for campaigns and party activities. Thus, the behavior of politicians could be judged, and by 
virtue of being clear was more likely to be followed – a good instance of statutes paving the way 
for behavioral change. 
Third, the law inaugurated an enforcement regime. Judge Raúl Gonzalez Ruiz, the first 
electoral judge in Asunción tasked with enforcing the law, remembers that when he first started 
enforcing the law, embezzlement and the misuse of state resources were endemic. In our data, 
Paraguay’s corruption score stood at .788 in 1996, far above the global average of .531 that year. 
Candidates routinely held campaign events in public buildings and used public resources, and 
Ruiz recalls evicting a band playing the Colorado Party polka from the Ministry of Public 
Works.7 The judge impounded nearly 100 official vehicles and a goat in the first municipal 
campaign cycle after the law passed.  
Fourth, the media took up the trumpet of anti-corruption, amplifying messages 
emanating from the judiciary. Indeed, officials charged with enforcing political finance 
regulations actively worked with the media to shame violators, and the media made extensive use 
of the law. Ruiz invited journalists to come with him to deliver injunctions, “The largest fear was 
exposure to the media. This generated intense fear in public servants… we always tried to take 
                                                
5 Interview with Carlos Riveros, July 19th, 2017. 
6 Interview with Alejandro Armendia, July 20th, 2017. 
7 Interview with Raúl Gonzalez Ruiz, July 17th, 2017. 
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the media with us when we intervened.”8 Former president Franco agrees that the media has 
helped enforce the law and its sanctions, “[Politicians] fear that a citizen or journalist might 
expose them… The media and social media served to make this law applicable.” 9  Thus, 
Paraguay’s experience suggests that in the absence of strong legal sanctions, social sanctions can 
help the anti-corruption features of a political finance reform take effect. This is the case even in 
Paraguay, which has a weak civil society, one of the lowest levels of political participation in 
Latin America, and few NGOs following political finance policy (Hetherington 2011, Nickson & 
Lambert 1997). 
 Finally, politicians and observers report that voters punish officials caught engaging in 
political finance-related corruption. Voters know that parties and campaigns receive public 
subsidies and they know that officials cannot use state resources for partisan activities. They 
denounce corruption to the media and appear to punish blatantly corrupt officials at the polls. 
Acha claims, “There has been little judicial consequence for cheating the system by the 
government, but a social consequence has been at play in punishing politicians who sell out. 
Voters don’t tolerate using public party funds and then proving disloyal.”10 Media monitoring of 
compliance with the 1996 law and voter punishment for those who violate it appear to reduce 
corruption, even where official audits and sanctions are rare. Thus, even with weak sanctions and 
uneven implementation, Paraguay’s campaign and party organization subsidies appear to have 
reduced corruption. 
Though we cannot say which of these five mechanisms was most important, it seems 
plausible that they all played a role in reducing endemic levels of corruption in Paraguay over the 
past several decades – an improvement registered in Figure 3 and supported by our interviewees. 
By all accounts, embezzlement and misuse declined precipitously after Ruiz and a handful of 
other electoral judges intermittently applied the law’s minimal punishments. Between the 1998 
general election and the 2003 general election, Paraguay’s corruption score dropped from .788 to 
.769, a notable improvement for a country with persistently high corruption. Now, a party 
official states, “The open use of state resources has diminished greatly. You won’t see people 
using state vehicles or taking cold hard cash from the state in order to fund a campaign.“11 Ruiz 
adds: 
In the first years of the 1996 law, the open proselytism in public offices 
mostly disappeared. It did waver throughout time, in accordance to how strict 
                                                
8 Interview with Raúl Gonzalez Ruiz, July 17th, 2017. 
9 Interview with Federico Franco, July 3, 2017. 
10 Interview with Sebastian Acha, June 27th, 2017. 
11 Interview with Cachito Mendoza, July 19th, 2017 
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electoral judges were at a given time, but there are certain things that just 
don’t happen anymore. You won’t find a political poster in a public office 
nowadays. I think there is still covert use of public goods in some areas. It is 
still done, but undercover, with numerous precautions. As a political practice, 
it has largely lost force. 
 Riveros speculates that, “Without this subsidy, corruption would have perhaps been 
more widespread, although the use of dirty money is still in play in our country.” 12  While 
Paraguay’s public subsidies reduced corruption by reducing the role of private money and 
increasing sanctions for corruption, political expenditures have grown much faster than subsidies 
in the last decade. As private money again becomes more important in Paraguayan campaigns, 
corruption has inched back up. Acha explains that, “As the cost of campaigns has risen, the 
positive effect has been reduced, as the amount of public financing represents less than 50% of 
total campaign costs, and now competes with private money of dubious origin.”13 Still, even with 
more illicit money in campaigns, observers state that embezzlement and the misuse of state 
resources have not increased. Overall, Acha claims that the 1996 law reversed a trend towards 
more and insidious forms of corruption, “The 1996 law has generally prevented this country 
from turning into a narcocracy, or a kleptocracy.”14 
 
Conclusion 
Every year, governments around the world disburse billions of public dollars to political parties 
and campaigns. Political finance reform has vocal proponents and critics among voters, 
researchers, and policymakers. Proponents claim that political finance regulations and subsidies 
reduce public corruption, reign in special interests, and broaden representation. Critics claim that 
subsidies channel public money to corrupt politicians and organizations, benefit established 
parties to the detriment of new or small ones, and waste public money. Despite these established 
debates, few studies have evaluated the effects of political finance laws. 
This project uses an original dataset of political party and campaign subsidies in 154 
countries over 112 years to evaluate claims about political finance laws and corruption. We argue 
that subsidies for parties and campaigns reduce corruption by curtailing the role of private 
money in politics and increasing sanctions for corrupt politicians. With more discretion over 
where funds come from and under the threat of more serious sanctions for malfeasance, officials 
                                                
12 Interview with Carlos Riveros, July 19th, 2017 
13 Interview with Sebastian Acha, June 27th, 2017 
14 Interview with Sebastian Acha, June 27th, 2017. 
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prioritize clean money over suspect funds. As a result, subsidies reduce corruption by displacing 
bribes and embezzlement, and accompanying campaign finance regulation increases the legal and 
social sanctions for being caught. 
 Our crossnational panel analysis finds that political finance reform is negatively 
associated with political corruption. The relationship remains stable after adjusting for time and 
country effects, and controlling for the quality of democracy, GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
population, and regular elections – along with a series of additional robustness tests carried out 
in Appendix C. An intensive case study focused on Paraguay’s 1996 political finance reform 
illustrates the process and the theoretical mechanisms behind the quantitative results: after the 
1996 reform, public corruption, particularly embezzlement and the misuse of state resources, 
decreased even in the face of uneven implementation. Officials attribute the decrease, in part, to 
political finance regulations.  
 This study contributes to debates on political finance by establishing a strong case for the 
role of political finance in reducing corruption – even in highly corrupt, poorly institutionalized 
political contexts. Indeed, the experience of Paraguay suggests that reforms may have the 
greatest impact where corruption is most widespread. In future research, we hope to be able to 
disentangle the effects of political subsidies and regulations – here understood as part of an 
omnibus treatment.  
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